中国上市公司董事会内部监督机制的效率研究 /The Efficiency Study on The Board’s Inner Monitoring Syste

2017-08-28 21:26:02

monitoring board inner 董事会 监督机制



如何建立有效的董事会已成为提高公司治理效率的关键问题,而董事会的效率在很大程度上体现在内部监督机制的效率上。本文的研究目的就是通过构建董事会内部监督机制的博弈模型,分析影响董事会监督机制效率的因素,从而对中国上市公司董事会监督机制的效率改进与提高提供理论上的支持。
本文通过设定外部董事的效用函数,建立了董事会内部监督机制的博弈模型。该模型描述了董事会生产“监督”产品的过程,揭示了董事会内部运作情况,同时进一步分析了董事会监督机制的效率以及影响监督效率的若干因素。本文将研究的视角放在股权集中下的企业董事会,通过对股权分散下董事会内部监督机制模型的扩展应用,分析股权集中下存在控股股东模式和内部人控制模式时的董事会内部监督机制。这样的分析弥补了以往国外研究的对象仅限于股权分散下企业这一缺陷。
另外,本文还将这个模型应用于中国的上市公司董事会内部监督机制的探讨,并进行了相关的实证和案例分析。分析的基本结论是:处于大股东或内部控制人控制下的董事会,其内部监督通常处于无效状态;在存在事后惩罚,以及来自大股东的内部董事占据多数的情况下,独立董事通常更愿意保持沉默,只有在可能的名誉损失超过事后惩罚时,才会进行监督行动;董事长与总经理两职的分离与否只是表面特征,在大股东控制之下,两职分离对于董事会的监督效率并无实质意义;在企业中,如果存在两个或以上力量相当的大股东,并且都在董事会中拥有董事席位,则会大大提升董事会的内部监督效率。同样,增加相关利益者的代表进入董事会任职,也会提升董事会的内部监督效率;最后,上市公司的信息披露对董事会的内部监督也有影响,上市公司的公共信息越多、越广和越深入,越能促进独立董事履行自己的职责,从而提升董事会的内部监督效率。
在上述分析基础上,本文还就如何改进与提高中国上市公司董事会内部监督机制的效率提出了若干建议。


How to build and maintain an effective board of directors has become the key problem of corporation governance, and the efficiency of the board depends on the efficiency of inner monitoring system. In order to provide theory support for enhancing the inner monitoring system’s efficiency of Chinese listed companies, in this article, the author analyzed the factors that influence inner monitoring system’s efficiency through a game model.
The author first constructed the utility function of the outside director, and on the basis of this, established a game model of board’s inner monitoring system to describe how a board to produce "monitoring" and reflect the board’s inner operation. Then, the thesis analyzed the factors that influence the efficiency of the board’s inner monitoring system. The another character of this paper is putting the board’s study angle under concentrated ownership structure, and analyzed the board’s inner monitoring system which controlled by the big shareholder or the inner controllers. Such analysis compensated the limitation of western researches which only focus on the enterprises of dispersed ownership structure.
In addition, this thesis also applied the model to board of Chinese listed companies, and carried on relevant empirical study and typical cases analysis. The basic conclusions as follows: first, if the board is controlled by the big shareholder or the inner controllers, its inner monitoring is usually invalid. Second, if afterwards-punishment do exist and the number of the inside directors from the big shareholder take the majority of the board, the independent directors are usually willing to keep more silence, only when the loss of reputation is bigger than the afterwards-punishment of monitoring, the independent directors would take monitoring actions. Third, It is only a surface characteristic whether the two duties of President of board and CEO separate or not. Under the big shareholder's control, whether two duties separated or not is no essence influences on the monitoring efficiency of the board of directors. Fourth, in enterprises, if there are two or more big shareholders with equivalent strength, and have seats in the board of directors will promote the inner monitoring efficiency of the board of directors greatly. So, increasing representative of relevant interestors in the board can promote inner monitoring efficiency too. Finally, the disclosure of the listed companies’ information has influence on the inner monitoring too, more widen and more deepen public information, more monitoring the independent directors will provide.
On the basis of analysis above, this thesis proposed several suggestions on how to improve and enhance the board’s efficiency of inner monitoring system of Chinese listed companies.