日本公司治理变革中的惯性与趋同/The Inertia and Convergence of The Reform of The Japan –Style Co

2018-09-27 05:50:18

治理 模式 style 趋同 Japan



日本模式和美国模式,是公司治理理论中两种不同的模式。前者以广义公司治理概念为基础,以利害相关者及其联系为核心。后者以狭义公司治理概念为基础,以股东利益和对经理的激励为核心。
上世纪,日本经济的高速发展为世人所瞩目,日本模式对经济的发展功不可没。然而,随着泡沫经济的崩溃,日本经济出现长期萧条。为了促进日本经济复苏,日本正经历着经济、社会的一系列改革。公司治理变革就是经济改革中的重要组成部分之一,日本模式出现了向美国模式趋同的现象。
本文首先对公司治理的理论和公司治理趋同理论进行了综述;在第一章理论探讨的基础上,接下来第二章对日本模式公司治理机制(包括“主银行联系”、“交叉持股”和“终生雇佣制和年功序列制”)的产生与发展的社会政治环境进行了研究;第三章详细论述了日本模式公司治理机制的特征与发挥的作用,并对美日两国公司治理机制进行了比较研究;第四章指出1990年代以后,随着日本泡沫经济的崩溃和经济的长期萧条,以“主银行联系”、“交叉持股”和“终生雇佣制和年功序列制”这三者为基础的日本模式公司治理机制发生弱化,为趋同创造了条件,本章对弱化的原因与表现进行了研究;同时还指出,日本模式各机制将在一定时期内继续发挥作用,表现为日本模式变革的惯性。
作为发生弱化的治理机制的替代,日本的外部治理机制正逐渐形成,同时内部治理机制也经历了许多改革。在这些变革与改革当中,都体现出了惯性与趋同共存的局面,这成为文章研究的重点。第五章指出,日本以企业养老基金等机构投资者为核心的外部治理机制已经初步形成,并发挥着越来越大的作用,体现出同美国模式的趋同,但惯性仍然阻碍了作用的充分发挥;第六章通过对日本企业主动改革形成的新的内部机制进行研究,指出激励机制与董事会改革都体现出向美国模式的趋同,但在实际操作中惯性依旧存在并影响改革成效。最后文章的第七章对日本公司治理变革中的惯性与趋同进行了概括与总结,并得出本文的结论,即日本公司治理模式在形式上正向美国模式趋同,但实际上趋同程度不完全,即日本公司治理变革存在相当的惯性,从而呈现出惯性趋同共存局面。



Japan –style model and U.S.–style model are two distinct styles of the Corporate Governance Theory. Japan –style model is based on the broad definition of Corporate Governance with stakeholders as its core consideration. While the latter is based on the narrow definition of Corporate Governance, and considers the benefit of stockholders and the stimulation to managers as its core consideration.
The boom of Japan economy in the last century is a hot topic of the economists, and Japan –style model is a reason of that rapid progress. However Japan economy has slipped into a long stagnation when the Bubble breaks. In order to recover the economy development, Japan is going through a series of reforms. Corporate governance reform is drawing attention as one of the keys to revive Japanese firms. And during this reform, there are some phenomena to say that Japan –style model is becoming convergence to U.S. –style.
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 reviews the literature on Corporate Governance and on the convergence in Corporate Governance. Chapter 2 introduces the emergence and development of Japan –style, which include ‘the main bank relationship’, ‘the cross shareholding’ and ‘the long–term employment and seniority–based wage systems’. Chapter 3 discusses the character of Japan –style and its function, and the author makes a brief compare of with U.S –style. In chapter 4 the author points out that Japan –style is becoming of less function because of the long stagnation, and then the author explore the reasons and presentations of it in detail. As a substitute, the outsider mechanism in which the corporate pension fund of Japan is the leader, and the insider mechanism which is mainly pushed by the companies itself have developed quickly. The author discusses these two mechanism in Chapter 5 and 6 respectively. Chapter 7 concludes the inertia and convergence of Japan’s corporate governance reform, and the author believe although Japan –style is converging to U.S. –style in appearance but it’s not a really convergence by now, in other words, there is a strong inertia in Japan –style which hinders the convergence to U.S –style.